We analyzed the privacy policies of 75 online tracking companies with the goal of assessing whether they contain information relevant for users to make privacy decisions. We compared privacy policies from large companies, companies that are members of self-regulatory organizations, and nonmember companies and found that many of them are silent with regard to important consumer-relevant practices including the collection and use of sensitive information and linkage of tracking data with personally-identifiable information. We evaluated these policies against self-regulatory guidelines and found that many policies are not fully compliant. Furthermore, the overly general requirements established in those guidelines allow companies to have compliant practices without providing transparency to users. Few companies disclose their data retention times or offer users the opportunity to access the information collected about them. The lack of consistent terminology to refer to affiliate and non-affiliate partners, and the mix of practices for first-party and third-party contexts make it challenging for users to clearly assess the risks and make meaningful decisions. We discuss options to improve the transparency and usability of online tracking companies' privacy practices.
INTRODUCTION
Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA) is the practice of tracking Internet users' online activities to deliver ads that are more likely to be relevant to them. While the advertising industry has attempted to self-regulate, Internet users, policy makers, and privacy scholars have raised concerns about the lack of transparency and user control.
In the current self-regulatory regime, OBA companies are directed to publish privacy policies to provide consumer notice and offer opt-out choices [3, 27] . Privacy polices have Non-reviewed DRAFT paper presented at the 42nd Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC 2014) been shown to be ineffective from a users' perspective [7, 17] ; however, they are important for providing transparency. Efforts are being made to interpret policies for users through natural language processing (NLP) tools [29, 38] and crowd sourcing [32] . These efforts will succeed only if privacy policies contain relevant information.
This project analyzed 75 online tracking companies' privacy policies, looking for 59 distinct practices relevant to users. We also gathered data about the proportion of members of ad industry self-regulatory programs and the prevalence of disclosures related to the most consumer-relevant practices and consumer choices.
We found that only 20% of online tracking companies in a public database listed affiliations with the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) or the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), the two predominant advertising self-regulatory organizations in the US. We also found important differences among the evaluated policies, both with respect to disclosed practices and clarity. We identified companies with more privacy-respectful practices as well as companies with more privacy-concerning practices.
Information sharing is unsurprisingly common, but companies tend to conceal their sharing partners' usage of that information. Half of the evaluated companies do not specify their data retention period. Moreover, most companies do not provide options to stop data collection and less than a third provide opportunities to opt out of targeted ads directly in their privacy policies. Most companies do not provide any access to collected information. Further, most companies are unclear or silent about collection and use of non-PII considered sensitive such as income range or health conditions. Large companies and ad industry self-regulatory association members exhibit relatively more comprehensive privacy policies.
We show that the current state of online advertising selfregulation does not provide the level of transparency and control that users demand. In addition to unusable privacy policies, the combination of advertising companies functioning as third-parties (i.e., not user-facing), and the widespread sharing of information among tracking companies creates additional transparency challenges. We conclude by discussing policy and technology options to improve the transparency and usability of online tracking companies' privacy policies.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We first introduce current practices and concerns related to OBA and efforts to protect users' privacy. We then discuss previous investigations of privacy policies of first-party websites in different domains. Finally, we discuss users' expectations of OBA.
OBA Practices and Self Regulation
In an attempt to make advertising more effective, online advertising companies track Internet users' online activities and show them ads based on their inferred interests. However, the advertising industry has been criticized for targeting ads based on sensitive or personal information [15] , discriminating against users [33] , or even manipulating users' purchasing intentions [6] . Privacy scholars have argued that the lack of transparency about consumer scores that online tracking companies create can lead to problems of abuse and discrimination as the lack of transparency about credit scores did before the enactment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act [9] . Online tracking companies collect and share users' tracking data in a way that allows data aggregators to create accurate profiles of users' interests and behaviors [2] . Large data aggregators are able to combine interest data with users' personal information and then sell that information to marketers [1] . In March 2013 Facebook announced a partnership with data aggregators to match ads based on users' online and offline behaviors [30] and other offline companies are already tying users' identities with their online activities [36] .
The U.S. Government has relied on industry self-regulation with special emphasis on the principles of notice and consent to protect users' privacy [12] . Advertising self-regulatory organizations require members to follow guidelines that include education, transparency, user control, use limitation and security practices [3, 27] . However, research has shown that users are unable to make decisions using transparency and user control tools provided by the ad industry and that member companies do not always comply with self-regulation transparency requirements [19, 20, 21] . Recognizing the existent problems with self-regulation and aiming to protect online privacy beyond OBA, the White House has asked companies to develop enforceable codes of conduct [37] and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recommended legislation to provide greater transparency and control over the practices of information brokers [13] . Finally, the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (CalOPPA) was amended in 2013 to require websites to state how they respond to Do-Not-Track signals. Accordingly, the California's Attorney General has issued a set of recommendations to improve the usability of privacy policies [16] .
Evaluation of Privacy Policies
There is a consensus that privacy policies have been ineffective at informing individuals about companies' privacy practices [7] . Cranor argues that privacy policies, and more generally notice and consent mechanisms, are meaningless unless users are empowered with usable and enforceable choice mechanisms [8] . An analysis of the usability of 64 privacy policies from both popular and health-related websites found that both types of websites had policies that were difficult for average Internet users to access and understand [18] . Research has also found that the content of healthcare websites' privacy policies does not match users' needs [10] , and that in order to understand those privacy policies users would need reading skills levels that most Americans don't have [14] . A longitudinal evaluation of 312 popular websites found that the average number of words increased and their readability has decreased over time [25] .
Researchers have also assessed the impact of government regulations on the content of privacy policies. An evaluation of health-related organizations' websites before and after the enactment of HIPAA found that transparency of practices increased, but policies became more difficult to understand and users' choices did not improve [4] . Similarly, a longitudinal study of 50 financial institutions' privacy policies found that although privacy policies contained more detailed information about sharing practices after the implementation of the GLB Act, the amount of sharing among affiliates and non-affiliates increased [31] .
In general, users don't like reading privacy policies, they don't understand them [24] , and they misunderstand their purposes [17] . Furthermore, it has been estimated that if Internet users read website privacy policies it would represent an annual cost of more then $700 billion dollars, which is higher than the cost of accessing the Internet itself [23] .
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has investigated privacy policies from online tracking companies with the level of detail that we present here. Furthermore, our work does not focus on readability of those policies, but their actual content. While difficult-to-read policies may be rewritten by experts or interpreted for users by automated tools or through crowd sourcing, incomplete policies do not contain sufficient information to allow for the extraction of useful information. Therefore, we assess the level of transparency of online tracking companies, which will impact the extent to which it may be possible to extract information from these policies [29, 32, 38 ].
Users' OBA Privacy Expectations
Surveys of Internet users have found high levels of concern about online tracking. Turow et al. found that 87% of telephone survey respondents would not allow advertisers to track them online if given a choice [34] . A more recent Pew telephone survey found that 68% of respondents did not like targeted ads because they didn't like having their online behavior tracked [28] . Qualitative research has found that users are not completely against targeted ads, but they are concerned about the lack of transparency and control that they have over the tracking that enables it [35] . Apart from tracking, transparency, and choice concerns, users have also expressed concerns about the type of targeted ads that they might see, which might lead to embarrassment [5] . In a study in which OBA companies' practices were shown to users, users relied most on OBA companies' sharing and retention practices to decide what types of information they would disclose for the purpose of receiving targeted ads [22] .
METHODOLOGY
In January 2014 we retrieved a comprehensive list of tracking companies from Evidon's online database.
1 This list had 2,750 companies under various non-mutually exclusive categories including, ad networks, ad servers, ad exchanges, analytics, optimizers, supply-side and demand-side platforms, data management platforms, publishers, among others. It also included the affiliations (if any) that these companies had with self-regulatory organizations. We also obtained a 
Selection of Companies
We began our analysis with three sets of 36 companies: The 36 largest companies; 36 member companies randomly selected from the set of companies that Evidon reported were affiliated with either of the two largest self-regulatory organizations (Network Advertising Initiative and Digital Advertising Alliance) in January 2014; and 36 companies randomly selected from the set of non-member companies. During the initial analysis process the size of the sets changed. The large set grew from 36 to 37 companies after we realized that one of the large companies, Adobe, had separate privacy policies for its analytics unit and its advertising unit. Therefore we decided to treat these units as separate companies. In addition, we eliminated three companies from the member set that were already included in the large set, thus reducing the size of the member set to 33 companies. Our final set was then comprised of 37 large, 33 member and 36 non-member companies.
In June 2014, after we completed the coding process, we found discrepancies between membership lists on the DAA and NAI websites and the affiliations listed by Evidon in January 2014. In particular, 20 companies with listed affiliations in Evidon's database were not included as members in the DAA or NAI websites. We also found that according to the DAA and NAI websites, 19 of the large companies were members. We decided to consider a company as a member only if it appeared in the DAA or NAI websites and to compare practices of member and non-member companies as well as practices of large and random companies. Therefore, we compared practices of companies in each of the following sets: large companies that were DAA or NAI members, hereafter referred as large members, non large companies that were DAA or NAI members, hereafter referred as random members, large companies that were not members, hereafter referred as large non-members, and random companies that were non-members. hereafter referred as random non-members.
In Section 4, we focus on comparing practices of members and non-members and we discuss specific differences between large and random companies if those differences exist.
Investigated Practices
We investigated 59 practices pertaining to collection, sharing, use, retention, user consent, access, contact, special provisions for children and European residents, security and user education. We selected these practices based on selfregulatory principles, FTC notice requirements, our knowledge of current practices in which advertising companies engage, as well as users' privacy expectations discussed in the research literature. Table 1 shows the specific practices that we attempted to extract from these privacy policies.
Policy Coding
Privacy policies are difficult to read and understand due to the use of legalistic and sometimes ambiguous language.
To reduce the number of potential coding inaccuracies, we followed a collaborative and iterative process. There were two stages: development of codes and coding the policies. Three researchers were involved in the first stage and two of them in the second stage. To develop the appropriate set of codes for each evaluated practice, researcher 1 reviewed 10 policies from the set of large companies and proposed a preliminary set of codes for each practice. Then, researchers 2 and 3 analyzed the same subset of large companies and applied the proposed codes to extract these companies' practices. Third, the three researchers discussed the preliminary extraction results and identified an improved set of codes. Table 3 in the Appendix lists the complete set of codes associated with the 59 practices shown in Table 1 .
Next, researcher 2 coded all the policies. Following the same agreed criteria, researcher 1 coded a subset of 15 policies (20% of each set). We compared the coding of these 15 policies and discussed instances were codes were different. Disagreement occurred due to either factual or interpretation errors. After fixing the factual errors, we conducted an inter-rater reliability test achieving an agreement of at least 80% on each investigated aspect. Then, researcher 1 revisited the rest of the policies to correct similar factual errors.
Interpretation errors happened due to missing or unclear information. For example, if the policy did not mention choices to limit collection of non-PII tracking data, one researcher would select "User cannot limit this practice" (see Table 3 in the Appendix), while another researcher would select "The policy doesn't mention this." We revised our coding criteria for user consent practices and decided to use "The policy doesn't mention this" unless it was explicitly stated in the policy that the user cannot limit the practice. Similarly, one researcher would select "Information is collected" if it was either explicitly mentioned or could be inferred that the company was collecting a given data type, while the other researcher would select "Information is inferred." We revised our coding criteria for collection practices and decided to reduce the granularity of the codes by grouping "Information is inferred," "Information is collected," and "Information is collected and inferred" in Table  3 in the Appendix as "Information is collected." We further grouped "Unclear" and "Policy does not mention" codes as "Don't mention." After specifying the new coding criteria we achieved full coding agreement for the subset of 15 coded policies. Researcher 1 then revisited the rest of the policies and applied the new criteria.
Policy Retrieval
Evidon's database included a URL that was supposed to link to each company's privacy policy. However, sometimes Evidon's links did not take us to the company's privacy policy. For example, sometimes Evidon's links pointed to the company's home page when Evidon had determined that the company did not have a policy, while other times the links took us to nonexistent web pages. When the URL did not link to a company's privacy policy, we visited that company's home page and looked for the privacy policy link (usually found at the bottom of the page). On most occasions, when Evidon's link was not functional we found that the company did not have a privacy policy. The exceptions were when the company had changed its name, or was merged with or acquired by another company. In those few cases, we used the Google search engine to determine the name of the new company and find its website and then its privacy policy if it existed. Some of the companies' privacy policies, mainly from the large category, included several links to other related pages. When that happened, we followed all available links to try to extract the practices of interest.
Limitations
The results we present in the next section offer a somewhat representative snapshot of OBA privacy policies in the winter of 2014. We tried to ensure a diverse set of companies by selecting both large companies and a sampling of random companies. Due to discrepancies between the information from Evidon and from the self-regulatory organizations that we were unaware of until after we completed coding the policies, we had to regroup our samples after we coded them. Thus our two random groups represent a mix of the two original random samples, and not a random sampling of the non-member and member groups.
While we observed that OBA companies do not change their privacy policies frequently, it is likely that a small number of companies changed their policies over the period of several weeks during which our coding took place, and more may have changed their policies since then.
Finally, while we attempted to code the policies as objectively as possible, privacy policies are often ambiguous, silent, and difficult to understand. Therefore, the codes selected for some of the stated practices are subject to researchers' interpretation.
RESULTS
We attempted to analyze privacy polices from 106 online tracking companies. As shown in Table 2 , we found that many non-member companies either did not have an online privacy policy, had a privacy policy that was not intended for tracked Internet users, or had websites written in a language other than English. Only 84 of the 106 companies we examined had a privacy policy written in English, and only 75 of those had a privacy policy that included relevant content for tracked users. Furthermore, the lack of privacy policies was more salient among random non-member companies, but there were also large non-member companies that did not have privacy policies written in English with relevant content for tracked users.
There were important differences among the evaluated policies both with respect to disclosed practices and clarity.
We organize the remaining results as follows. First, we report self-regulation affiliation rates. Second, we discuss important practices that are not disclosed or unclear. Third, we present stated practices that we consider problematic as well as those that we deem more privacy respectful. Finally, we discuss hurdles that make privacy policies of OBA companies challenging to understand.
Low Self-Regulation Adoption
Only a small fraction (30%) of tracking companies in Evidon's online database listed affiliations with self-regulatory organizations, and a smaller fraction (20%) listed affiliations with any of the major self-regulatory organizations in the US. Furthermore, only 18 (49%) of 37 large companies in our sample were DAA or NAI members and only 10 (14%) of 69 randomly selected companies were DAA or NAI members.
Regardless of whether the company was listed as member in either the DAA or NAI websites, we looked for any mention of affiliations with self-regulatory organizations made in the privacy policies themselves. Table 12 in the Appendix shows which companies claimed affiliations with any selfregulatory organization. All member companies included statements regarding their affiliations with self-regulatory organizations; however, we also found that one non-member company (sojern.com) claimed affiliation with the DAA, but was not listed as member on the DAA website. We emailed the DAA on June 24 and June 30 of 2014 informing them about this situation, but we did not get any response.
Silent and Unclear Practices
In this section, we show that non-member companies were less transparent than member companies across all practices; however, a large fraction of member companies were also silent with respect to important practices including, data collection, sharing, purpose of use, retention, and user consent.
Collection
While most companies do not explicitly mention the collection of non-PII such as anonymous demographic or interest data, most of them mention the logging of page visits or inferring users' interests. Therefore, whenever a company mentioned anything related to logging page views or making inferences about users' interests, we coded that as collection of non-sensitive non-PII. Unsurprisingly, Figure 1a shows that most of the companies state they collect non-PII. In fact, as shown in Table 4 in the Appendix, only two nonmembers (one large and one random) did not mention the collection of non-PII.
However, Figure 1b shows that, a very large fraction (87%) of non-member companies and more than a third (38%) of member companies don't explicitly disclose whether or not they collect sensitive non-PII (p < 0.001, Fisher's exact test).
While we could have assumed that the lack of disclosure meant "no collection," we decided to differentiate between those companies that explicitly state they do not collect such information and those that are silent about it. Making a clear statement about the collection of sensitive non-PII is particularly important as research has shown that users are not comfortable disclosing sensitive information such as health or income related information [22] , and many companies do not exhaustively list the information they collect, commonly stating that collection is "not limited to" a given list of data types.
As shown in Figure 1d , many of the companies were also silent about the collection of geolocation data, where a large fraction of both non-member (48%) and member (31%) companies did not include any statements regarding collection of this data type.
Sharing
Sharing practices are particularly important because an uncontrolled transfer of information could lead to unclear, if not unintended, uses against users' expectations. We investigated sharing practices with both affiliates and nonaffiliates. We considered as affiliates those companies under the same ownership, or those companies that receive information to provide a service to the company under analysis and that are contractually obliged to only use such information to provide the requested service. Here we discuss non-affiliate sharing. As shown in Figure 2a , most of the companies share only non-PII with non-affiliates. However, a considerable fraction of companies (17.3%) are silent about non-affiliate sharing.
We further investigated whether companies disclose more specifically with whom they share. Unsurprisingly, as shown in Figure 2 , companies were more silent as we looked into more specific types of sharing. Specifically, Figure 2b shows that non-member (44%) are more silent than members (21%) about sharing with other ad companies (p = 0.05, Fisher's exact test).
Particularly important is the sharing with non-affiliates that can link received data with users' offline behavior or otherwise with PII. However, as shown in Figures 2c and 2d, both member and non-member companies are silent about these situations. Again, we could have assumed that the silence regarding these practices meant that it does not happen. Nevertheless, merging tracking data with PII and offline data is not an uncommon practice. Data brokers, which are often recipients of information sold by online tracking companies, often merge individuals' PII with their interest data collected via other methods. In addition, companies do not assume responsibility for non-affiliate recipients' practices. Therefore, we considered it important for companies todisclose explicitly whether they share information under these circumstances.
The NAI code of conduct and DAA self-regulatory principles require member companies to provide a notice indicating how collected data will be used, "including transfer, if any, to a third party." This generic notice requirement makes it easy for companies to be compliant, however, it does not allow users to assess the risk of those data transfers.
Furthermore, while the NAI requires members who transfer non-PII to non-affiliates to require those recipients to "not attempt to merge such non-PII with PII" unless the Figure 1 : Collection Practices user opts in [27] , opt-in methods are also usually unclear and often users who voluntarily provide PII to other thirdparties (usually in a different context) are implicitly opting it for such merging. Interestingly, the DAA principles also have a similar transfer limitation requirement, but that requirement only applies to service providers, not third-party trackers [3] . Finally, the NAI code of conduct only requires companies to offer an opt-out choice if they want to merge non-PII collected in the future (as opposed to previously) with PII [27] .
Use
We attempted to extract statements related to various use practices including, ad targeting, marketing, user and ad analytics, website customization, enforcement of terms, and "other purposes." Here we limit our discussion to the former four. Table 6 in the Appendix shows detailed use practices for each company. The types of information used for targeted ads are shown in Figure 3a .
Most companies (81%) explicitly state that they use either non-PII or both non-PII and PII for targeted advertising; however, there are "analytics" providers, "ad servers," and other ad related companies, which are not explicit about their engagement (or lack of) in targeted ads. Specifically, Figure 3a shows that non-member companies (28.3%) are more silent than member companies (3.4%) about this practice (p = 0.006, Fisher's exact test).
While we could have assumed that analytics providers would not engage in targeted ads and ad servers would, we found a handful of analytics companies that state that they engage in targeted ads and some ad servers that were silent about the practice. For example, Table 6 in the Appendix shows that three non-member companies (userreport.com, foreseeresults.com and twelvefold.com), explicitly state that they do not engage in targeted ads. The former two are classified in Evidon's database as analytics providers, hence it is not surprising that they do not engage in targeted ads. However, twelvefold.com is categorized as ad server in addition to analytics provider, yet it does not mention advertising purposes in its policy. Furthermore, there were other companies categorized as analytics providers that state they engage in delivering targeted ads (e.g., whos.amung.us, advanseads.com). Therefore the categorization of a company cannot be used to infer its data use practices when the company does not explicitly state those practices. Figure 3b shows marketing (e.g., use of contact information for marketing purposes practices.) More than half (53%) of companies do not engage in marketing practices and (23%) explicitly state that they perform marketing. However, a considerable fraction of member (17%) and nonmember (28%) companies who collect PII do not disclose whether or not they use this information for direct marketing purposes.
"User analytics" is defined as the practice of analyzing users' actions on first party websites and "ad analytics" is defined as the practice of evaluating the performance of advertisement everywhere they are shown. Both of these are common practices among online tracking companies; however, as shown in Figures 3c and 3d , a large fraction of companies do not disclose whether or not they engage in these practices.
Retention and Access
Both the DAA and NAI allow retention "as long as necessary to fulfill a legitimate business need, or as required by law" [27] . We found that many companies use similar language to obscure their retention periods. While it is reasonable that companies need to keep information to fulfill their business needs, this vague requirement should not prevent them from establishing a retention period. We are also unaware of any laws that require these companies to keep tracking data and believe that adding the phrase "as required by law" in this context is misleading. Figure 4a shows that a large faction of non-member companies (80%) and a smaller fraction of member companies (24%) do not disclose the retention period of collected non-PII (p < 0.001, Fisher's exact test). Figure 4b shows that many companies (68%) do not mention any opportunity for users to access information they collect about or infer from users' online activities. Only a quarter (24%) of member and a small fraction (4%) of nonmember companies offer "anonymous" or both "anonymous" and "authenticated" access. Therefore, in general very few companies provide access to this information. Table 7 in the Appendix shows detailed retention and access practices of each company.
Consent Mechanisms
We investigated consent mechanisms to both determine the extent to which companies comply with NAI and DAA requirements and assess the salience of the choices offered. The NAI code of conduct establishes various user consent practices. It requires collection of users' opt-in consent before 1) merging PII with previously collected non-PII, a practice the NAI calls "retrospective merger," 2) use of precise geolocation data for targeted ads, and 3) use of sensitive data for targeted ads. It further requires offering of opt-out choices for collection of information for targeted ads (but not collection for other purposes) [27] . The DAA establish more lax consent requirements as it only requires companies to offer the opportunity to opt out of collection and use of data for targeted ads (but not collection for other purposes) [3] .
Many companies offer opportunities to opt out of targeted ads (see Figure 5a ), however the opportunities to stop the Figure 5c ). Also, while most companies do not engage in merging non-PII with PII (59%) or with offline (53%) data, the majority that can engage do not specify consent options for any of those practices (see Figures  5d and 5e ). Specifically, a quarter of member (24%) and non-member (26%) companies do not mention any choices to limit merging of PII and non-PII, although their polices suggest that such merging is possible. Furthermore, Figure 5f shows that none of the companies that mention tracking across devices offer any options for users that limit it. Overall, while many companies offer opt-out choices for targeted ads, only very few offer choices for data collection, and almost none offer explicit choices to prevent merging of PII with non-PII.
Disclosed Practices
There were several companies with more transparent and explicit practices. We first discuss companies with more privacy-respectful practices and then those with more questionable practices.
Privacy-friendly practices
Five (17%) member and three (7%) non-member companies explicitly mention that they do not collect sensitive non-PII (see Table 4 in the Appendix for details). Furthermore, a large fraction of both member (41%) and non-member (44%) companies state that they do not collect information that personally identifies users.
Remarkably, one random member (rocketfuel.com), one large member (adadvisor.net), and two random non-member (foreseeresults.com, visbrands.com) companies explicitly state that they do not share with entities that can link received data with PII. Moreover, the two non-member companies also state that they do not share with entities that can link received data with offline data.
A handful of both member and non-member companies state specific and limited retention periods for tracking data, which range from 20 days to 2 years.
In addition, while many companies only offered the opportunity to opt-out of targeted ads, but not the opportunity to opt out of being tracked, we found 8 (24%) members and 11 (28%) non-member companies (see Table 8 in the Appendix) using language that suggests that users can actually limit online tracking when they opt out.
Finally, as shown in Table 12 in the Appendix, one large member and two large non-members indicate that they take measures to anonymize IP addresses. The large member (quantcast.com) indicates, "we do not store full IP addresses." One non-member (histats.com) states, "In order to ensure better privacy protection, Histats anonymize all IP addresses: the last three digits of the IPv4 are deleted immediately, and last 64 bits on IPv6." The second non-member company (gemius.com) refers to location information as "geographic location on the basis of anonymized IP address."
Privacy-concerning practices
A large fraction of members (45%) and a small fraction of non-members (6.5%) collect or infer sensitive non-PII (p < 0.001, Fisher's exact test). Similarly, a large fraction of both members (38%) and non-members (44%) collect PII without mentioning any use restrictions, and both member and non- Figure 5 : User Consent Practices. "N/A" denotes many companies that were not clear or explicit about engaging in the given practice and hence they do not offer related choice options. "Don't engage" denotes companies that explicitly stated that they do not do the given practice.
member companies were silent about user choices to limit merging of non-PII with PII. Moreover, a small fraction of member (10%) and nonmember (13%) companies share PII or both PII and non-PII with non affiliates. Similarly, a small fraction of both member (14%) and non-member (7%) companies also state that they can share with non-affiliate companies that can link non-PII with PII.
While many companies do not disclose or are unclear about their retention period for online tracking data, one large non-member (optimizely.com) discloses unlimited retention period. It states that "Non-personally identifiable information may be stored indefinitely."
Opt-Out implementation
All member companies that engage in targeted ads offer opt-outs and, interestingly, a large fraction (41%) of nonmember companies also claim to offer the opportunity to opt out of targeted ads.
The most popular opt-out methods among member companies are either a link to the DAA/NAI opt-out pages (76%) or DAA/NAI home pages (79%). Surprisingly, we found that a considerable fraction of non-member companies also include links to the DAA/NAI opt-out pages (22%) or DAA/NAI home pages (6.5%), even though those pages are only useful for opting out of targeted ads from members.
A large fraction of member companies (52%) compared with non-member (20%) companies use opt-out pages, where companies explain with somewhat more detail how targeted ads work, and provide an opt-out button as well as links to the DAA and NAI websites. Less than half of member companies (41%) and a relatively small fraction of non-member companies (17%) include an opt-out button directly in the privacy policy.
As shown in Figure 6 , other choice methods include the opportunity to access and edit anonymous profiles (e.g., bluekai.com/registry), edit personal profiles (adobe.com), opt out from participating in research surveys (voicefive. com), opt out from other companies (optimizely.com), establish preferences to receive text alerts for ads based on location (att.com), adjust account settings (digg.com), among many other specify ones. Overall, we found that many companies offer opt-out choices for targeted ads and marketing communications. However, user choices for other purposes such as collection of tracking data, merging of tracking data with PII, or tracking across devices are rather limited.
Other disclosures
We investigated several other types of disclosures made in OBA privacy policies, including educational material, companies' contact information, policy change notifications, mergers and acquisitions notifications, whether or not special provisions for European residents and children are mentioned, as well as data security practices. Tables 10 through 12 in the Appendix show the details for each company.
Educational material
Both the NAI and DAA establish requirements to educate users. A large fraction of companies refer to cookies, web beacons, tags, pixels, or "pieces of code" to describe how they track users' online activities. However, describing how tracking works is arguably not very educational as users often do not understand the technology jargon used to describe it. Therefore, we searched for other educational material (or pointers to it) in the privacy policy. Figure 7 shows the fraction of companies making statements to describe online tracking and providing educational statements or links. We found two main types of educational material: suggestions to configure cookie browsing settings and pointers to the website http://www.allaboutcookies.org/. A few companies also provided a link to the DAA consumers' page http://www.aboutads.info/consumers. However, neither of these two websites provide useful recommendations to protect online privacy, but mostly talk about the benefits of cookies and online advertising. A large fraction of both member (76%) and non-member (72%) companies include these kinds of educational material in their privacy policies.
Information providers
The NAI requires companies to be diligent about receiving data for OBA purposes "from reliable sources that provide users with appropriate levels of notice and choice" [27] . Nevertheless, we found that while 79% of member companies mention that they receive information from thirdparties, they do not indicate that those sources provide "appropriate levels of notice and choice," being reliable or otherwise accountable for handling user information responsibly. Examples of statements used include, "at times may also use Non-PII data from third parties," or "we may combine Non-Personal Information with data collected from other sources." Notably, the remaining 21% of member companies do not even mention whether or not they receive information from other entities.
Europeans and children's provisions
We also looked at whether privacy policies included any particular statements for children or Europeans. As shown in Figure 7 , a large fraction of member (65%) and a smaller fraction of non-member (30%) companies include statements for Europeans. These statements were shown more often when the company collected PII and they usually cited the US-EU and US-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks. Some companies also cited European regulations or European selfregulation organizations such as youronlinechoices.com/ uk. Similarly, more than half of member (62%) and nonmember (54%) companies include statements regarding children under 13. However, we did not find any company mentioning the self-regulatory program for children's advertising [26] . 
Self-regulation affiliation claims
All member and 20% of non-member companies mentioned their affiliations with self-regulatory organizations. However, not all of these mention affiliations to the NAI or DAA. In particular, one large member (facebook.com), one large non-member (disqus.com), and four random non-member (tapjoy.com, apple.com, att.com, and verizon.com) companies mention affiliations with TRUSTe. Furthermore, one large non-member (gemius.com) and one random non-member (userreport.com) companies mention adherence to ESO-MAR (esomar.org), an European organization.
Security provisions
We found that most of the companies include boilerplate security statements, which we did not code. Instead, we looked at whether the companies stated that they encrypted the collected data. Notably, one large member named Neustar (adadvisor.net) states that "the contents of AdAdvisor Cookies are encrypted, and can't be read without the encryption key." We also found that one large member (tapjoy.com) and one random member (addthis.com) use exactly the same sentence to indicate that they use encryption, "We take reasonable security measures to protect against unauthorized access to or unauthorized alteration, disclosure or destruction of data. These include firewalls and encryption." Other companies also mention encryption, but were not specific about which data was encrypted, for example a random non-member company named SET Media (www.set. tv) mentions, "to maintain the security of its network and the data we collect. We use various technologies, including, in certain instances, encryption."
Policy changes and updates
We found that a large fraction of companies do not include a statement explaining how users will be informed if the privacy policies changed. Many non-member (44%) and member (24%) companies do not provide policy-change notifications to users (p = 0.05, Fisher's exact test). However, there were also companies (41%) across both sets that explicitly state that a notice would be provided in the policy when it changed. Some of the companies who collect contact information further indicate that they would both provide a notice in the policy and email customers if their policies changed. 
Mergers and Acquisitions
During our evaluation period, we noticed that mergers and acquisitions among tracking companies are common. Notably, one large member company (bluekai.com) was acquired by Oracle, and a few other small companies were merged with larger or other small companies. Therefore, we looked into provisions related to how users would be informed and what options would be offered to them in case of mergers or acquisitions. Unsurprisingly, given our previous results, many companies (28%) across both sets were silent about this practice. Furthermore, a large fraction of companies (61.3%) across both sets mention that they may share users' information in case of mergers, yet do not mention any notification for users or any user choices. However, we also found four member (14%) and two non-member (4%) companies mentioning that some form of notice would be provided, two of them (one member and one non-member) indicating that users would be able to opt out of the sharing of their personal information.
Understandability Hurdles
Here we discuss identified aspects that make these privacy policies difficult to understand and act upon.
Mixed Practices
Online tracking companies normally have many "partners," which may include advertisers, publishers, other advertising or tracking companies, etc. We found that often privacy policies are unclear about who the intended audience is, often mixing practices that apply to their partners, their websites' visitors, and tracked Internet users. In very rare cases privacy policies are designed to exclusively inform tracked users and more often policies include paragraphs or sentences that could apply to both partners and tracked users, making it very difficult to disentangle the practices that apply exclusively to tracked users.
Among both member and non-member companies we observed several companies that are both service providers in first-party contexts as well as online tracking companies. These include both large (e.g., Adobe, Verizon, CBS, etc.) and smaller (e.g., Tapjoy, WildTangent Games, Traffiq, etc.) companies. Although large companies are clear about some of the different practices that apply to direct customers and general audience of tracked users, smaller companies are often less clear. There are often situations were it is impossible to determine whether a given practice applies to direct customers, tracked users, or both. A typical example of this situation is when a company collects personal information from a first-party relationship as well as tracking data. In this case, many companies are not explicit about linking or not tracking data with personal information. The situation is worse with other practices such as uses, sharing, access, and retention period, where it is often impossible to differentiate between practices that apply to information collected in first-party and third-party contexts.
Terminology
Given that sharing practices are common among advertising companies, we investigated how these companies define the affiliates and non-affiliates with whom users' information is shared. Many companies do not mention affiliates or non-affiliates, and those who do mention them, do not provide a clear definition, mentioning them vaguely. For example, privacy policies include sentences like, "may use or share the information we collect with our affiliates and third parties, such as our service providers, data processors, business partners and other third parties,""may share with advertisers and their service providers and partners," "may share with interested third parties," or "may use or share the information we collect with our affiliates and third parties, such as our service providers, data processors, business partners and other third parties,""may share with our partners like publishers, advertisers or connected sites."
While it is understandable that tracking companies may have different partnerships, from a users' perspective, it is very difficult to accurately determine which of those may or may not follow the same practices as the company under scrutiny. A consistent definition of affiliates and nonaffiliates that tracking companies can use to refer to companies that follow or not their same practices would help users to better understand sharing and other practices and then be in a better position to assess the associated risks.
Companies also have different definitions of sensitive data. While for some companies income bracket is considered sensitive, for many others it is not. Similarly, for some companies over-the-counter medications are not sensitive data while others do not specify whether or not such data is sensitive. Also, geo-location is considered sensitive information by a small number, but not by many others. Without a clear definition of what constitutes sensitive data as well as a clear separation between sensitive and non-sensitive tracking data, Internet users cannot be certain whether advertising companies' practices infringe their privacy.
DISCUSSION
OBA self-regulation is not providing effective privacy protections. Participation in self-regulation is voluntary and we found that only 20% of 2,750 companies in a public database of online tracking companies listed affiliations with the DAA or NAI, the two main online advertising self-regulation organization in the U.S. The discrepancies between affiliations included in Evidon's database as of January of 2014 and members listed in the DAA and NAI websites as of June 2014 suggest that membership may be dynamic and companies might join and leave at will. Interestingly, we also found that a handful of non-member companies suggested that users could opt out from OBA by visiting the DAA or NAI opt-out pages, which offer opt-outs only from their members.
We also found that the NAI code of conduct and DAA selfregulatory principles allow member companies to be compliant without offering significantly better protections than non-member companies. Further, the NAI limited definition of sensitive data allows member companies to collect or infer information that research has shown users are not willing to share with online advertisers. Also, while member companies are more likely to have a privacy policy, both member and non-member companies have privacy policies that are silent about practices that impact users' privacy.
The DAA and NAI limitations for sharing with thirdparties and merging PII and non-PII are not protective. Tracking companies that collect PII in first-party contexts can freely merge it with tracking data. Member companies who share with third parties are not required to mention the purpose of sharing. The end result is that information about users' online activities is often freely shared and such information can be linked with PII.
Improving notices for users
Transparency and usable users' choices are necessary for a self-regulated market to function. However, we have found that online tracking companies are not transparent and do not offer meaningful choices to users. User consent is often implied when the user visits a website with tracking. The NAI code of conduct requires companies to collect opt-in consent before using sensitive data or location for targeted ads, but it is unclear how to obtain opt-in consent in thirdparty contexts. The third-party nature of tracking in combination with the lack of transparency makes user consent meaningless.
Efforts are being made to use natural language processing (NLP) techniques to interpret privacy policies [29, 38] ; however, if the problems identified here are not fixed, those efforts will be fruitless. For example, if companies are silent or have mixed practices, neither humans nor automatic algorithms will be able to make good use of them. We have compiled a list of 59 aspects that online tracking companies could use as a guide to assess the content of their privacy policies.
We found many companies with more privacy-respectful practices; however, the current status of notices don't allow them to stand out from less protective companies or enable users to use that information to make privacy choices. We believe that finding ways to standardize terminology and structure of policies will benefit both users and those companies with more privacy-respectful practices.
We identified several factors that make online tracking companies' privacy policies very hard to evaluate and understand. The lack of, affiliates and non-affiliates definitions, agreement about sensitive and non-sensitive data, clarity about practices that apply for information collected in firstand third-party contexts, and clarity about the merging of non-PII with PII, makes it challenging to differentiate what kinds of information are shared with whom and assess privacy risks for users. Including a policy section that consistently defines affiliates and non-affiliates, collected or inferred data types, and data uses can improve these policies. We then could imagine a tabular section similar to a privacy nutrition label [24] that summarizes privacy policies in a more understandable manner. The fact that OBA practices have become complex should not mean that Internet users should bear the burden of this complexity.
While traditional standardized privacy policies are necessary to make companies accountable for their practices and improve transparency in general, more usable privacy notices can be used to truly empower users. In particular, from a users' perspective, we recommend requiring advertising companies and websites to implement three levels of interactive privacy notices: privacy icons, privacy summaries, and privacy choices.
Privacy Icon. A conspicuous privacy notice in the form of a meaningful icon could be provided on websites. The icon would convey at least one of the following four situations:
• No tracking exists on the website
• Tracking exists only for website customization and user analytics (no sharing)
• Tracking exists for advertising purposes without involving users' personal information and with limitations on the use of sensitive inferences, sharing only with entities that will use it for the limited purposes explained in the policy, and limited retention period
• Tracking exists for other purposes (e.g., advertising, marketing, or any other purpose) without explicit collection, sharing, and retention limitations.
Importantly, it would be necessary to use a standard definition of these icons and terms. Furthermore, such an icon would need to be placed in a consistent and salient place (e.g., at the top of the webpage) and have an appropriate size and shape, allowing users to notice the icon and realize they can click on it. Furthermore, the icon should not be placed in the boundaries or inside ads as not all tracking is necessary related to advertisement and it could also mislead users into thinking that the icon is part of the ad (as previous research has shown [21] ). A tooltip could be added to the icon, succinctly explaining its purpose and encouraging users to click on it to learn details. Consistent icon location and shape across websites are important to educate users gradually about its purpose and benefit.
Privacy Summaries. When applicable (i.e., when tracking exists on the website), this notice may be linked from the privacy icon and should contain a concise summary to make it easy for users to quickly assess the risks and determine if they want to take any action. Based on previous research [22] , the privacy summaries could inform about the following: what the purpose of tracking is; whether or not sensitive information (e.g., health conditions, income range, location, etc.) is being collected or inferred from users' activities; whether or not the information used or collected for tracking purposes can be linked to users' identity; whether or not that information is shared with non-affiliates; and whether or not those non-affiliates can link received information with users' identity. In addition, this notice could provide a link to a webpage where users could exercise their privacy choices. Such link could be labeled properly to communicate that users can benefit from clicking on it. For example, the label can say, "Change your privacy settings here." As in the case of the icons, it is also important for the design of privacy summaries to be standardized to gradually educate users about their purpose and benefit, and to facilitate comparison of websites' practices.
Interactive Notice with Choices. When applicable (i.e., when tracking exists on the website), a third notice linked from the privacy summary could provide detailed information regarding what has been collected or inferred about the user. This third notice could also provide choice mechanisms to allow users to remove whatever information they don't want advertising companies to know about their online activities; provide the opportunity to express a preference to not be tracked at all; and provide the opportunity to express a preference to collect only certain information or make certain inferences, but not others. Providing users with access to the information collected or inferred about them is also important because it enables users to visualize the effect of data aggregation, enabling them to assess the risks more realistically.
CONCLUSION
We used Evidon's public list of 2,750 online tracking companies and Evidon's 2013 global report to draw a sample of 106 of these companies, including large companies, companies that are members of self-regulatory organizations, and non-member companies. Only 75 of these companies had English-language privacy policies with content relevant for tracked users, which we analyzed thoroughly. We found that most of these companies are silent with regard to important consumer-relevant practices including the collection and use of sensitive information and linkage of tracking data with personally-identifiable information. Policies lacked a clear and consistent definition of non-affiliates with whom online tracking companies share user information. Policies also mixed practices that apply to information collected in firstand third-party context, and they are rarely intended only for tracked users, but more often intended for different audiences simultaneously (e.g., partners, website visitors, and tracked users). These facts would make it very difficult and sometimes impossible for users to determine what practices apply to them and be able to properly assess the associated privacy risks. Unless these problems are fixed, ongoing efforts to use natural language processing (NLP) techniques and crowd sourcing to interpret privacy policies will not be able to improve transparency and empower users to protect their privacy in the context of OBA.
We also evaluated these policies against self-regulatory guidelines and found that many policies are not fully compliant. Furthermore, while member companies are more likely to offer the opportunity to opt out of targeted ads, previous research has shown that users are concerned about online tracking and interested in controlling data collection, an option that companies are not offering. We have provided recommendations to improve clarity and usability of online tracking companies' privacy policies. Table 4 : Collection practices by companies that have an English-language privacy policy for tracked users. While most of the companies mention collection of device identifiers and general non-PII, they don't explicitly mention the collection (or lack of) of sensitive non-PII (e.g., race, religion, sexual orientation, health conditions, income bracket, or credit score). A small number of companies that collect PII also indicate that they don't link PII with tracking data. Table 5 : Sharing practices by companies that have an English-language privacy policy for tracked users. The cells show the types of information shared with each of the listed entities. Companies share extensively non-PII with non affiliates, but they don't mention with which particular affiliates the information is shared with. Most companies are particularly silent about sharing information with entities that can link online tracking data with offline data or PII. Only four companies (TargusInfo, VisibleBrands, RocketFuel, and ForeSee Results) explicitly say they don't share with entities that can link online tracking data with PII. Table 6 : Uses by companies that have an English-language privacy policy for tracked users. Cells show the types of information used for the listed purposes. Most of the companies use non-PII to deliver targeted ads. We defined "Marketing" as the practice of using contact information to offer products."Don't engage" means the company explicitly say it does not use information for that practice, with the exception of marketing where we entered "Don't engage" if the company either explicitly says so or it does not collect PII. Table 8 : User consent practices by companies that have an English-language privacy policy for tracked users. Cells show the choices offered to users for each of the listed data uses. "N/A" means the company does not mention that practice (i.e., we don't know if it does it or not) and therefore no consent options are applicable. While most of the companies offer the opportunity to opt out of targeted ads they don't mention any options to limit online tracking. Nevertheless, there are 18 companies (Gemius, BlueKai, Tynt, Adobe Analytics, VoiceFive, Nielsen, Histats, ShareThis, whos.amung.us, Axciom, Yahoo, Bazaarvoice, Media Innovation Group, AT&T AdWorks, Twelvefold Media, SET Media, Usability Sciences, and UserReport ) that state users can opt out of online tracking. The reason why ForSee results says "opt-in" for collection of non-PII is because users voluntarily participate in online surveys implemented by this company. This company also doesn't link data across surveys in a way that survey takers are uniquely identified. While most companies don't engage in merging non-PII with PII or off-line data, those that do engage don't specify consent options for that practice. None of the companies that mention tracking across devices offer any option to limit it. Table 10 : Contact details by companies that have an English-language privacy policy for tracked users. "Privacy team" is used when a company provides an email with the word "privacy" in it or otherwise gives an indication that a privacy-related person (e.g., CPO or similar) is the recipient of the communication.
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